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ABSTRACT Today’s computer networks are under increasing threat from malicious activity. Botnets
(networks of remotely controlled computers, or “bots”) operate in such a way that their activity superficially
resembles normal network traffic which makes their behaviour hard to detect by current Intrusion Detection
Systems (IDS). Therefore, new monitoring techniques are needed to enable network operators to detect
botnet activity quickly and in real time. Here we show a sonification technique using the SoNSTAR
system that maps characteristics of network traffic to a real-time soundscape enabling an operator to hear
and detect botnet activity. A case study demonstrated how using traffic log files alongside the interactive
SoNSTAR system enabled the identification of new traffic patterns characteristic of botnet behaviour and
subsequently the effective targeting and real-time detection of botnet activity by a human operator. An
experiment using the 11.39 GiB ISOT Botnet Dataset, containing labelled botnet traffic data, compared the
SoNSTAR system with three leading machine learning-based traffic classifiers in a botnet activity detection
test. SoNSTAR demonstrated greater accuracy (99.92%), precision (97.1%) and recall (99.5%) and much
lower false positive rates (0.007%) than the other techniques. The knowledge generated about characteristic
botnet behaviours could be used in the development of future IDSs.
INDEX TERMS Botnet Detection, Intrusion Detection Systems, Network Monitoring, Situational Aware-
ness, Sonification
I. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
NETWORK administrators commonly use a combinationof Intrusion Detection System (IDS) software and sen-
sors that inspect traffic on the network and wait for anoma-
lous events to occur. Intrusions are defined as ‘attempts to
compromise confidentiality, integrity, or availability of data,
or to bypass the security mechanisms of an IT system’ [1,
p.147]. Network security monitoring is a crucial task in
protecting organisational infrastructure from today’s hidden
and increasingly complex intrusions and attack patterns [2].
In 2015, IBM analysts reported a number of types of
attempt to break into networks and organisational infrastruc-
tures, such as exploiting ‘a vulnerability to inject command
code into software, exploiting a backdoor, or bombarding a
system with random passwords in hopes that one will work’
[3, p.3]. They declared that the majority of networks of all
sizes are at risk and that ‘CISOs and security leaders are now
looking for fundamental ways to influence and improve both
their own programs and established best practices’ [3, p.14].
This article looks at the problem of detecting botnet traffic.
A botnet is a network of remotely controlled devices, or
‘bots’, such as personal computers and smartphones, whose
security has been breached and control access given to a third
party. The botnet controller directs the activities of the bots
through messages sent via standard network protocols. Bot-
nets are used for various malicious purposes such as conduct-
ing distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, spreading
spam, spying, and stealing personal information [4]. They
propagate over legitimate communication connections and,
because an individual bot may send only a few packets to the
host under attack, the volume of traffic looks normal.
Behind every attack is an underlying motive, and knowing
what it is might allow administrators to anticipate attacks that
might be deployed against their networks [5]. Axelsson and
Sands suggested that in ‘dealing with the more imaginative
threats, a human operator needs to be in the loop and in
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order to be effective there should be tool support that enables
her to quickly gain an understanding of the situation’ [6,
p.26]. SoNSTAR (Sonification of Networks for SiTuational
AwaReness) [7], [8] is a monitoring tool developed to com-
plement existing IDSs to provide another degree of flow
granularity to operators, helping them to understand how
a specific network operates and behaves. It leverages the
human auditory system’s ability to detect and recognize sonic
patterns by mapping features of network traffic to sound, thus
enabling an operator to listen to their network.
SoNSTAR reads every single packet entering and leaving a
network and associates it with a flow (a sequence of packets
between a source and destination host). It then conveys the
state of each flow sonically while simultaneously updating a
log file with information that helps the operator to understand
the reasons for the sounds generated; for instance, when the
operator wants to refer to certain behaviour or pattern repe-
tition or to find the IP addresses of the devices implicated in
that behaviour. This paper describes a sonification approach
using SoNSTAR to target botnet behaviour in TCP traffic.
A. RELATED WORK
Existing IDS technologies rely on a variety of techniques to
detect botnets, including identifying repetitions of requests,
statistical methods [9], [10] and entropy detection [11], and
all such techniques tend to ‘collect flow information from
bots to depict their behaviour’ [12, p. 976]. A challenge
facing all detection techniques is to validate them on real
networks which vary from the test environments in which
they were developed [12].
To-date, using visualization techniques to support botnet
detection has received only modest attention. Seo et al. [13]
proposed a security visualization tool called CCSvis to target
botnet behaviour based on Domain Name System (DNS) traf-
fic. CCSvis presents visualizations of traffic using cylindrical
coordinates to enable a human operator to identify botnet
behaviours and patterns. Thus, detection is a cooperative
activity involving both human and machine.
Kim et al. [14] also visualized DNS traffic with the aim of
detecting botnets before they start carrying out their attacks.
They defined four patterns of graphs as botnet signatures
which can be identified by a human operator. Experimental
results suggested that visualization could be used to detect
both known and unknown botnet types.
Visual Threat Monitor [15] is a flow-based system which
combines data mining and visualization to enhance botnet
traffic detection. Its visualization method uses processed and
selected data rather than raw data and the outputs consist of
correlations, statistical analysis, clustering, aggregation, and
visualization.
While some network sonification work has been reported
[16]–[22] the technique has not yet been applied specifically
to botnet detection. Below we show how the SoNSTAR
system may be used to complement an existing IDS by
sonifying network traffic in such a way as to enable botnet
behaviour to be detected and identified by a human operator
without the use of any botnet detection algorithms or machine
learning classifiers.
B. MAIN RESULTS
This work deals with the extension of SoNSTAR by mapping
TCP traffic flow features to sound such that it enables the
human operator to recognize botnet activity and patterns
without the need to manually inspect the traffic’s content. The
first contribution is the construction of four new traffic fea-
tures that target parallel, horizontal, distributed and repetitive
flow behaviours plus four new algorithms to process event
feature conditions.
The second contribution is the discovery and definition of
six patterns of botnet behaviour based on IP flow. We created
a new flow type called IP flow [7] which is identified within a
certain time period by its source and destination IP addresses
and protocol (as opposed to a traffic flow which is further
differentiated by port number [23]). The significance of this
discovery is that botnets exhibit unique repetitive IP flow
patterns which can be used to detect them at the network
layer instead of the growing demand to detect botnets at the
application layer. The third contribution consists of using
IP flow patterns for classification instead of using packet
patterns, which opens up a new path of research to find better
ways to develop IDSs in the future based on IP flows. Fi-
nally, as a fourth contribution, the proposed sonification tool
(SoNSTAR) is an interactive, flexible, and scalable approach
for botnet traffic detection that can be adjusted according to
the understanding of the human operator and future security
demands, and this is the first sonification solution to target
botnet detection.
II. BOTNET SONIFICATION USING TCP
To consider how to apply sonification to botnet activity the
characteristics of botnet traffic and behaviour must first be
understood.
A. CHARACTERISTICS OF A BOTNET
TCP botnet traffic has certain characteristics that can be
distinguished amongst legitimate traffic as follows [24], [25]:
1) Botnet lifecycles go through the same five stages. The
first stage is infection and propagation where the bot-
master infects new targets such as computers or servers
to became bots. Propagation mechanisms refer to the
method used to expand and search for new machines.
They consist of horizontal scans, vertical scans, coordi-
nated scans and other sophisticated propagation meth-
ods. A vertical scan is described as scanning a single
host across a defined range of ports. Horizontal scans
are where a single port is scanned across a defined range
of hosts.
The second is rallying, where a bot connects to the
C&C (command-and-control) server or the bot receives
updates such as a list of C&C IP servers. The third
is command and report, where the bot connects to the
C&C server to receive commands and to send its activity
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reports. The fourth is ‘abandon’ where a bot becomes
unusable. The fifth is securing, where the botmaster tries
to conceal its bots from security detection systems.
2) The C&C mechanism has three architectures. The first
is centralized, where the botmaster communicates with
bots through a central C&C server. The second form is
decentralized, where bots also act as C&C servers based
on a peer-to-peer (P2P) network model. The third type
is hybrid, where the botmaster can use any applicable
protocols and architectures to implement its model.
3) Botnets perform several malicious activities depending
on their size (large- or small-scale) such as DDoS and
spamming.
However, botnets are a rapidly evolving phenomenon that
is still not well understood. Moreover, bots mostly connect
with C&C servers or other infected nodes which act as C&C
servers using normal traffic communication patterns which
are repeated again and again. Bots are relatively consistent
in the repetitive communication mechanisms employed be-
tween them when they are using a P2P network model. Bots
may scan the network to collect information that may help
the botmaster to prepare for future attacks such as infecting
other devices. Also, bots might be part of a botnet launching
an attack such as a DDoS where they continuously commu-
nicate with an external host using similarly repetitive traffic
patterns. Accordingly, SoNSTAR was extended to extract
features and to enable users to create events and mappings
to explore and identify bot behaviours.
B. EXPLORING TRAFFIC FOR BOTNET DETECTION
Exploring traffic aims to identify events useful in the recog-
nition of botnet behaviour. Since botnet traffic does not have
a specific behaviour, we aimed to define more features that
allow the discovery of events which might be part of a
botnet’s behaviour. This method allows the user to assign
sounds to different events based on his/her knowledge and
experience and the literature on botnets.
Botnets exhibit stealthy behaviour in several ways in-
cluding distributed behaviour, parallel behaviour, repetitive
behaviour and stealth scanning. Stealth scanning is described
as using vertical or horizontal scans with low frequency to
avoid detection [26]. Parallel flow behaviour occurs when a
single host establishes flow connections with several network
hosts on several ports. Distributed flow behaviour is where a
local host receives several flows from different external hosts
on several ports. Repetitive flow behaviour is where repeated
flow patterns are observed and which are caused by bots re-
peatedly carrying out the same task (performed automatically
or to a schedule) over the internet [27]. Although the previous
SoNSTAR design is capable of addressing various traffic
behaviours, horizontal, distributed, parallel and repetitive
stealth behaviours were not addressed.
Since, on the face of it, botnet flows resemble normal
traffic, additional features need to be considered to support
the recognition of botnet activity. The method consists of
using sonification to monitor events which are suspected as
evidence of botnet activity. The operator then reviews the log
files corresponding to these suspicious events and creates a
pattern based on IP flow features to match the selected events.
This pattern can then be associated with a specific sound in
SoNSTAR allowing any occurrences to be monitored. For
example, in normal traffic behaviour, it is virtually impossible
to find identical IP flow patterns repeated within a single time
window.
Botnet activity could consist of several different combi-
nations of traffic events. It is left to the human operator to
explore and decide which events might be part of botnet
behaviour. The correlation of events is useful for monitoring
botnets by looking at botnet characteristics. This approach
is very effective when performing real-time monitoring. The
human mind correlates events to understand situations based
on events’ sounds, sequence, occurrence, and other factors
such as the nature of the network and the motivation of
expected attacks. There is no specific rule to be used to
recognize botnets but a human can look for various events
and behaviours and tune thresholds according to his or her
accumulated knowledge and understanding of botnet activity
such as stealthly and repetitive behaviours, which indicate
botnet activity.
C. SoNSTAR UPDATED DESIGN
Sonification has the potential to assist in the discovery of
patterns of botnet network activity and relationships between
seemingly disparate security events, though little has been
done to leverage sonification technologies in current practice.
SoNSTAR [7] is a tool for supporting the situational
awareness of network administrators that provides a real-
time auditory representation of TCP/IP traffic. SoNSTAR
works by inspecting the status flags of TCP/IP packet headers
to identify traffic features; combinations of features then
trigger the playback of the different elements of a sound-
scape. By noticing the timing, loudness, and sequence of
the various sounds an administrator can monitor the network
and become aware of possible malicious behaviour without
needing to continuously look at a visual display. Once an
operator becomes used to the sound of a network’s normal
behaviour, the system allows small changes to be detected in
much the same way that an experienced mechanic is able to
troubleshoot problems with an engine through listening to the
sounds it makes. Full details of the system and its effect on
user workload are described in an earlier paper [7] and the
system and example audio files can be accessed at the project
repository [8].
SoNSTAR was designed to fit the work practices and
operational environments of network security monitoring
analysts in order to raise their situational awareness through
reflecting human understanding in the monitoring process.
The solution starts by extending SoNSTAR to enable the op-
erator to explore a network’s botnet traffic patterns. Publicly-
available labelled botnet datasets were used to demonstrate
the technique. To address the problem of botnet detection
SoNSTAR was extended as follows.
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1) Feature Extractor — Selected TCP Parameters
SoNSTAR works by selecting combinations of IP traffic
features and mapping these feature combinations to discrete
sounds in its soundscape. Table 1 shows 29 of these map-
pings (see the project repository [8] for further details). Four
new arrays were implemented to collect more features that
facilitate the targeting of repetitive parallel, horizontal and
distributed flow behaviour.
The first array collects features which are used to identify
any local hosts that attempt to perform parallel repetitive
flows within the local network during a time window. The
new feature events provide interesting knowledge about IP
addresses and port number mechanisms within network traf-
fic. Fig. 1 illustrates the features collected to target local
source IP addresses which perform internal network parallel
repetitive behaviours. The first column in the array contains a
local source host, the next column contains a destination port
number, and the next column contains the number of packets
sent from the local source host to the destination port number.
The features collected by the feature extractor into array 1 are



















FIGURE 1. Features for targeting the behaviour of local parallel repetitive
flows. Local host 192.168.0.10 is repeatedly sending the same four packets to
certain ports on multiple destination hosts on the network.The features
collected are: list of local source hosts, destination port numbers, count of
packets sent to each port.
The second array collects features that help to identify
any local hosts that experience distributed repetitive flows
behaviour from external hosts during a time window. Fig. 2
illustrates the features collected to target local IP addresses
which have experienced distributed repetitive flow behaviour.
The first column in the array contains a local destination host,
the next column contains a destination port number, and the
next column contains the number of packets received from
the external source host by the local destination host through
the destination port number. The features collected by the
feature extractor into array 2 are listed in Table 3.
The third array collects features that help to identify any
local hosts receiving distributed flows (such as a hidden
scan behaviour and malicious distributed flows as legitimate
queries) from external hosts during a time window. Fig.
3 illustrates the features collected to identify local hosts

















FIGURE 2. Features for targeting the behaviour of incoming distributed
repetitive flows. Multiple external hosts are targeting ports on local hosts with
the same three packets. The features collected are: list of local destination
addresses, destination port numbers, count of packets sent to each port.
and vertical scans or other distributed activity. The features
are collected for all local destination hosts in every time
window. The features collected by the feature extractor into


















FIGURE 3. Features for targeting incoming vertical flow scans. Multiple
external hosts are targeting ports on a single local host. The features collected
are: list and count of local ports, list and count of source addresses.
The fourth array collects features that help to identify any
local hosts attempting to perform local horizontal and parallel
activity within the local network during a time window pe-
riod. Fig. 4 illustrates the features collected to target internal
network horizontal scans and parallel flow activities, and the

















FIGURE 4. Features for targeting local horizontal and vertical scans and
parallel flow activities. The features collected are: list and count of destination
hosts, list and count of destination ports.
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TABLE 1. Events-to-sound mappings
No Feature Conditions Sound
1 SYN in IPs <30 and SYN ACK out IPs >0 and ACK in IPs >0 and RST out IPs <10 Forest bird
2 SYN in IPs >10 and SYN in IPs <30 and PSH ACK out IPs == 0 and RST out IPs >0 Rain on roof
3 SYN in IPs >8 and SYN ACK out IPs <4 and PSH ACK out IPs <50 Rain on roof
4 SYN in IPs >300 and SYN ACK out IPs <20 and PSH ACK out IPs <300 Thunder
5 SYN out IPs >10 and SYN ACK in IPs <3 and PSH ACK out IPs == 0 and RST in IPs >0 Rain
6 SYN out IPs <30 and SYN ACK in IPs >0 and PSH ACK out IPs >0 Forest bird
7 ACK in IPs >1 and RST out IPs >0 and the rest of IP flow feature == 0 Seagulls
8 ACK out IPs >1 and RST in IPs >0 and the rest of IP flow feature == 0 Loon
9 FIN in IPs >9 and FIN in IPs >SYN out IPs and FIN in IPs >SYN in IPs and F 4 >10 and PSH ACK out IPs <2 and PSH
ACK in IPs <2
Cricket
10 FIN in IPs <50 and ( FIN in IPs <= SYN out IPs or FIN in <= SYN in IPs) Forest bird
11 FIN out IPs >9 and FIN out IPs >SYN out IPs and FIN out IPs >SYN in IPs and FC 3 >10 and PSH ACK out IPs <2 and
PSH ACK in IPs <2
Sheep
12 FC 7 >9 and PSH ACK out IPs <5 and PSH ACK in IPs <5 Owl
13 NULL in IPs or NULL out IPs >0 Frog
14 URG PSH FIN in IPs or URG PSH FIN out IPs >0 Wolf
15 LAND in IPs or LAND out IPs >0 Beach
16 RST in IPs >30 and ACK in IPs <100 and PSH ACK out IPs or PSH ACK in IPs <2 Wind on grass
17 RST out IPs >30 and ACK out IPs <100 and PSH ACK out IPs or PSH ACK in IPs <2 Wind on grass
18 FC 1 >4 and PSH ACK out IPs or PSH ACK in IPs == 0 Fountain
19 FC 2 >4 and PSH ACK out IPs or PSH ACK in IPs == 0 Heavy rain
20 RST out IPs >30 and FC 5 <FC 14 and ACK out IPs <5 and PSH ACK out IPs <2 Wind
21 RST in IPs >5 and FC 6 <FC 15 and ACK in IPs <5 and PSH ACK in IPs <2 Wind
22 Flow Counter >1000 Fire
23 IPs Flow Counter >600 Fire
24 Src addr1 A count >200 Mosquito
25 Src addr1 A count >50 and Identical packet counts1 >250 Mouse squeaking
26 Dst addr2 A count >200 Bee Colony
27 Dst addr2 A count >50 and Identical packet counts2 >250 Rats (multiple) squeak
28 Src addr count3 >85 and Dst port count3 >95 Spring Peeper
29 Dst addr count4 >85 and Dst port count4 >95 Grass hopper
TABLE 2. The features collected in array 1.
Feature Description
1 Src addr1 A Local host A (Source IP) has sent packets to
another local host B during current time
window period.
2 Dst port1 B The destination port number on local host B
has received one or more packets local host
A identified in element 1.
3 Packet count1 The number of packets sent from local host
A to the local host B through the destination
port number identified in element 2.
2) Feature combiner
At the end of each time window, the new features extracted
using algorithms 1 to 4, together with the IP flow features
and traffic flow features are passed to SoNSTAR’s feature
combiner. The feature combiner uses the IP flow and traffic
flow features to obtain newly discovered combinations to be
used to create new events.
TABLE 3. The features collected by algorithm 2.
Feature Description
1 Dst addr2 B Local host B has received one or more
packets or from external hosts during the
current time window period.
2 Dst port2 B The destination port number on local host B
identified in element 1 which has received
one or more packets from an external host.
3 Packet count2 The count of packets received through the
destination port identified in element 2.
Since the existing SoNSTAR design already has eight
combinations, we have updated the design by adding seven
new features as shown in Table 6.
3) Sonification
In this stage, SoNSTAR assigns events using the extracted
features and then assigns recorded sounds to them. Here,
event conditions can be modified, new events can be created,
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TABLE 4. The features collected in array 3.
Feature Description
1 Dst addr3 Local host B has received one or more
packets from a local and external hosts.
2 Src addr3 list List of source addresses that have sent
packets to local host B (element 1).
3 Src addr count3 The count of source addresses in the list from
element 2.
4 Dst port list3 The list of destination ports on local host B
which received one or more packets from
sources in the hosts list.
5 Dst port count3 The count of destination ports in the list
identified in element 4.
TABLE 5. The features collected in array 4.
Feature Description
1 Src addr4 Local source host A has sent one or more
packets to a local destination host.
2 Dst addr list4 The list of local destination hosts that have
received one or more packets from local host
A.
3 Dst addr count4 Count of destination hosts in the list from
element 2.
4 Dst port list4 The list of destination ports of the local hosts
from element 2 which received one or more
packets from local host A.
5 Dst port count4 Count of destination ports in the list from
element 4.




FC 9 Result of (SYN out IPs) + (FIN in IPs)
FC 10 Result of (ACK in IPs) − (ACK out IPs)
FC 11 Result of (FIN in IPs) + (FIN out IPs)
FC 12 Result of (PSH ACK in IPs) − 1
FC 13 Result of (ACK in IPs) + (FC 9)
FC 14 Result of (RST out IPs) − 1
FC 15 Result of (RST in IPs) − 1
and threshold values can be changed. Most of the interaction
of the operator with SoNSTAR to explore and construct
new events and to explore malicious behaviours and botnet
patterns occurs at this stage.
SoNSTAR’s real-time interaction capability allows the lis-
tener to choose to listen to some of the event sounds or to
specifically targeted events representing certain behaviours
and to ignore others or to change event conditions and
assigned sounds.
4) Sound mapping and design
Sounds are mapped by assigning recorded sounds to events.
Most of the events in the previous design have been mapped
to the same original sounds with some modifications. A few
events were dropped from the original design. In addition,
new events are assigned to new recorded sounds. These
recorded sounds are set to allow the user to recognize botnet
events. SoNSTAR events are mapped to represent the occur-
rence of events derived from the SoNSTAR features. Table 1
lists the new feature-to-sound mappings.
At the end of each time window, Algorithm 1 checks
whether any local source IP (Table 2, row 1) has created 200
or more flows, and this feature is called “Src addr1 A count”.
It also checks whether any packet count (Table 2, row 3) is
less than 15 packets and is repeated 250 times during the
time window. It counts the number of identical packet counts
which has less than 15 packets passed through the destination
ports. This feature is called “Identical packet counts1”.
Algorithm 1 Process the features of Array 1.
Time-window period ended
Call Function with Array1 and index1
Open logs text file1 to write
for pointer1 <= array index do . Get all row information in the list
Get local source address (Source IP) Column1 of Array1
Get Sent packet count (Packet count) Column3 of Array1
Rest (Src Addr1 Count1) = 0 and (Identical Packets Count1) = 0
State1= False
for pointer2 <= array index do . Compare with all sources list
Get next source IP in the array (Src ip)
Get next packet count in the array (P count)
if Source IP == source ip then
increase (Src Addr1 Count1) by 1
if SrcAddr1Count1 >= 50 then
State1= True
end if
if SrcAddr1Count1 >= 200 then
Write to logs file1, Anomaly
Send message of Event 24 to Max/MSP Patch
end if
end if
if Packet count == P count, And Packet count =< 15
then
increase (Identical Packets Count1) by 1
if State1 == True, And
Identical PacketsCount1 >= 250 then
Write to logs file1, Anomaly





Algorithm 2 checks whether any local destination IP (Ta-
ble 3, row 1) has created 200 or more flows and the generated
feature is called “Src addr1 A count”. It also checks whether
any packet count (Table 3, row 3) is less than 15 packets and
is repeated 250 times during the time window. It counts the
number of identical packet counts which have less than 15
packets passed through the destinations ports. This feature is
called “Identical packet counts2”.
Algorithm 3 checks each local destination host (Table 4,
row 1) in array 3, for when the count of source hosts (Table
4, row 3) is greater than 84 and the count of destination ports
(Table 4, row 5) is greater than 95.
Algorithm 4 checks each local source host (Table 5, row 1)
in the array 4 for when the count of destination hosts (Table
5, row 3) is greater than 84 and the count of destination ports
(Table 5, row 5) is greater than 95.
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Algorithm 2 Process the features of Array 2.
Time-window period ended
Call Function with Array2 and index 2
Open logs text file2 to write
for pointer1 <= array index do . Get all row information in the list
Get destination address ( Dest IP) Column1 of Array2
Get total received packet count (Packet Count) Column3 of Array2
Rest (Dst addr2 count2) =0 and (Identical Packets Count2) =0
for pointer2 <= array index do . compare with all dest IP’s
Get next destination IP in the array (dest ip)
Get next packet count received in the array (p count)
if Dest IP == dest ip then
increase (Dst addr2 count2) by 1
if Dst addr2 count2 >= 50 then
State1= True
end if
if Dst addr2 count2 >= 200 then
Write to logs file2, Anomaly
Send message of Event 26 to Max/MSP Patch
end if
end if
if PacketCount == p count, And packet count < 15 then
increase (Identical Packets count2) by 1
if State1 == True, And
Identical PacketsCount2 >= 250 then
Write to logs file2, Anomaly





Algorithm 3 Process the features of Array 3.
Time-window period ended
Call Function with Array3 and index 3
Open logs text file3 to write
Rest array C to collect malicious IP address list
for pointer <= array index do . Get all row information in the list
Get destination address (dest IP)
Get sources list and their count
Get destination ports and their count
if Src addr count3 >= 85, and Dst port count3 >= 95 then
Write to logs file3
Write to logs file3, Anomaly
Send message of Event 28 to Max/MSP Patch
end if
end for
The thresholds for the above features were determined
heuristically according to the nature, purpose, and expected
traffic volumes for the specific network in question. Obvi-
ously, these would need to be adjusted for each separate net-
work environment, though the above would serve as useful
defaults for a network with modest numbers of visitors.
SoNSTARs´ main algorithm is shown in Algorithm 5.
III. EXPERIMENTAL WORK
A. DATASET
A number of traffic datasets are available to researchers.
The 1999 DARPA Intrusion Detection Evaluation dataset
contains three weeks-worth of traffic data.1 The first and third
weeks are attack-free, with the second week containing a
variety of labelled attack traffic. However, it is not labelled
with sufficient detail to support tool evaluation and does not
1https://ll.mit.edu/ideval/data/1999data.html.
Algorithm 4 Process the features of Array 4.
Time-window period ended
Call Function with Array4 and index 4
Open logs text file4 to write
Rest array D to collect malicious IP address list
for pointer <= array index do . Get all row information in the list
Get sources address
Get destination list and their count
Get destination ports and their count
if Dst addr count4 >= 85, and Dst port count4 >= 95 then
Write to logs file4, array extracted information
Write to logs file4, Anomaly
Send message of Event 29 to Max/MSP Patch
end if
end for
Algorithm 5 SoNSTAR’s main algorithm.
Set Time-window period
Sniff packet and Get start time
if Packet == arrived then
Unpack ethernet header
Extract protocol
if protocol == 8 then . IP packet
Unpack IP header
Extract source and destination addresses
Extract transmission protocol
else
Get next packet from the sniffer
end if
if protocol == 6 then . TCP packet
Unpack TCP header
Collect and Extract (array Traffic flow, array IP flow) features
Collect and Extract (array1, array2, array3 and array4) features
Count IP flows and Traffic flows
if T ime− windowperiod == finished then
Extract new features from Features Combiner
Process Events of (array1, array2, array3 and array4) features
Process Events of (array Traffic flow, array IP flow) features
Write logs files while processing event conditions
Send Event messages of to Max/MSP for sonification
end if
Get next packet from the sniffer a new Time-window started
else
Get next packet from the sniffer
end if
else
Get next packet from the sniffer
end if
Max/MSP Patch
if messages == arrived then
Play sound of similar messages once
end if
indicate which are the malicious packets [28]. Furthermore,
because some traffic has been inserted post hoc into the
original data the dataset does not maintain trace consistency.
The KD-99 dataset is based on the DARPA set and inherits
its limitations. The CAIDA [29], PREDICT [30], and DEF-
CON [31] datasets all contain anomalous traffic but are not
labelled. The University of New Brunswick provides several
datasets of network traffic [32]. Their ISCX 2014 dataset is
comprehensively labelled. However, the ISOT dataset from
the University of Victoria [33] is labelled packet-by-packet
and distinguishes normal from malicious traffic and so is well
suited to the purposes of this paper and was the most recent
such dataset available at the time of conducting this work.
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1) Evaluation dataset
The ISOT evaluation dataset [34] was used for the exper-
iment. The dataset is an 11.39 GiB PCAP-format file and
contains traffic conforming to the TCP, UDP, DNS and ICMP
protocols. The dataset contains Strom, Waledac, and Zeus
botnet command and control traffic. The dataset is labelled
and contains a number of malicious and non-malicious flows,
as shown in Table 7. The dataset was gathered by the French
chapter of the Honeynet Project.
TABLE 7. Breakdown of ISOT malicious and non-malicious flows.




B. EXPERIMENT 1: EXPLORING TRAFFIC FOR BOTNET
ACTIVITY
Botnets mostly use distributed normal behaviour and stealth
horizontal and vertical activity to prevent detection, but repet-
itive traffic patterns still occur as bots are programmed to
repeat scheduled tasks. For example, the botmaster sends
an order through the C&C server to make its army of bots
perform attacks against a specific web server. Since bots
are usually high in number and use identical software, parts
of their communication patterns will be identical or quite
similar. Therefore, the victim web server is going to receive
similar communication patterns from different bots, which is
extremely unlikely in normal traffic.
SoNSTAR does not use any machine learning processes;
instead operator-defined events allow the operator to target
different network behaviours. The experienced user chooses
what events should be sonified and then decides whether
the behaviour being heard is suspicious or not. A single
botnet attack will typically comprise several specific events.
The operator recognizes several event sounds in a different
sequence. The sound type and sequence allow the operator to
understand what is going on in their network. For example, in
performing a SYN scan an adversary sends SYN packets to
several ports on the target machine. SoNSTAR will play the
sound of rain telling the operator that there are many SYN
packets incoming to a specific host. Every open port then
replies with a SYN-ACK packet, but closed ports reply with
RST packets. Therefore, the target machine will send an RST
packet against each closed port causing SoNSTAR to play a
wind sound. So, when SoNSTAR generates rain followed by
wind sounds, the operator would know that a SYN packet
scan is happening.
To explore this traffic with SoNSTAR, the operator carries
out the following steps.
1) Set appropriate time window period.
2) Run SoNSTAR to read from the ISOT dataset.
3) Listen to the soundscape for any sounds indicating
malicious behaviour or suspicious activity.
TABLE 8. Sample of vertical activity to local destination IP log file.
Time window Flow i.d. Local Dest. Local port No. packets
4 483 172.16.0.11 2490 13
4 484 172.16.0.11 2491 13
4 485 172.16.0.11 2492 13
4 486 172.16.0.11 2507 13
4 487 172.16.0.11 2508 13
4 488 172.16.0.11 2509 13
4 489 172.16.0.11 2512 13
4 490 172.16.0.11 2513 13
4 491 172.16.0.11 2520 13
4 492 172.16.0.11 2521 13
4 493 172.16.0.11 2526 13
4 494 172.16.0.11 2527 13
4 495 172.16.0.11 2529 13
4 496 172.16.0.11 2531 13
4 497 172.16.0.11 2532 13
4) When a candidate sound is heard, open the log file
corresponding to the event which triggered the sound.
5) Search the log file for a message indicating the local IP
address and the time window number which caused the
sound in order to confirm recognized behaviour.
6) Open the IP flow log file and look for the same time
window number and then locate the local IP address
obtained in the previous step.
7) Assign a recorded sound to the suspected botnet pat-
tern and set an event condition for when the pattern
is repeated twice in a time window to confirm it is
a botnet performing repetitive tasks using identically
programmed bots.
An initial time window was set at 35 seconds and then
SoNSTAR was run on the dataset and its soundscape listened
to. Different time windows can be chosen, but the longer the
window the longer the user has to wait to hear changes in
network state (see section III-C2 below for comparisons at
different time window settings). The repeated sequence of
a bee colony sound (Table 1, row 26) followed by multiple
rat squeak sounds (row 27) were observed during a single
time window. The bee colony sound indicates that a local
host has received connections from more than 200 different
external hosts during this time window. This indicates a high
possibility of distributed flow behaviour. The multiple rat
squeak sound indicates that a local host has received the same
number of packets from 250 different external hosts. This
indicates a very high possibility of repetitive flow behaviour.
Since this behaviour is suspicious and also strange to be
occurring in a single time window, it is suspected that this
behaviour belongs to a botnet. Therefore, the log files are
inspected to confirm the situation. Table 8 shows part of the
log file at time window 4 which contains these events.
It is observed that the local host 172.16.0.12 has
received the same number of packets (13) from different
external hosts into different ports. The log file also shows
these port numbers are sequential. Also, the local host has
connections with 497 different external hosts in this time
window. All of this information leads to the suspicion that
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this is botnet behaviour. Furthermore, the spring peeper
sound (Table 1, row 28) indicates that a local host has
received connections from more than 85 different external
hosts through more than 95 different ports. This is suspected
to be a horizontal scan but this depends on the purpose
of the local host and its expected traffic. Also, it indicates
that the local host might be part of a botnet communication
network. Therefore, the log file was inspected. For example,
at time window 8, the local destination host 172.16.0.11
has received connections from 461 different external hosts
through 615 different ports, as shown in Fig. 5. Fig. 5 also
shows part of the external host list. Fig. 6 shows part of the
local port list at the local destination host. The complete log
files can be found in the ‘examples/logs’ folder in the
SoNSTAR repository [8].
8 Dest IP: 172.16.0.11 Sources count: 461
Ports count: 615












FIGURE 5. Sample of external horizontal scan log file, part 1.
'66.170.2.43' '213.199.154.22' '212.115.192.194']
ports list: ['10004'
'10005' '10006' '10007' '10012' '10018' '10019' '10020'
'10021' '10029' '10030' '10031' '10034' '10039' '10044'
'10048' '10049' '10050' '10052' '10053' '10060' '10066'
'10067' '10070' '10073' '10077' '10080' '10083' '10084'
'10085' '10091' '10095' '10096' '10101' '10102' '10105'
'10110' '10112' '10113' '10120' '10123' '10126' '10127'
'10129' '10131' '10133' '10136' '10138' '10142' '10147'
'10150' '10153' '10156' '10159' '10161' '10162' '10165'
'10171' '10178' '10181' '10182' '10183' '10184'
FIGURE 6. Sample of external horizontal scan log file, part 2.
1) Results and botnet patterns
Two local IP addresses were identified (172.16.0.11 and
172.16.0.12) which exhibit suspicious behaviour over
several time widows. Based on our knowledge of botnet char-
acteristics, this confirms that botnet behaviour is detected.
One goal of the experiment was to determine whether or
not SoNSTAR features can create events capable of targeting
specific behaviour. Clearly, SoNSTAR features and events
can be used to draw a base line for normal traffic behaviour.
One of the purposes of SoNSTAR is to support existing
IDSs and to contribute to their development by helping
human operators to discover features, events, and patterns
that can be used by IDSs to detect malicious behaviour.
Therefore, to use SoNSTAR to detect and confirm botnet
patterns, the operator carries out the following steps.
1) Open the IP flow log file and look for the same time
window number and then locate the local IP address
obtained in the previous steps.
2) Assign a new recorded sound to the suspected botnet
pattern and set an event condition to play that sound
when the pattern occurs twice in a time window. The
repetition of this event indicates that bots are performing
repetitive specific flow patterns.
The IP flow log file was opened and the IP flow patterns
associated with the suspicious traffic obtained. Feature con-
ditions to match the traffic were constructed and mapped to
sounds as shown in Table 10. When SoNSTAR was run, the
sounds of a squirrel running quickly and a rat moving in dry
leaves were heard which confirmed the presence of botnet
behaviour. Therefore, IP flow features demonstrated very
advanced capabilities for constructing patterns which can be
used to detect botnet traffic. SoNSTAR could help the user
to discover botnet behaviour by only mapping for repetitive
normal patterns within the TCP traffic without the need to
consider the application layer. The IP flow log files can be
found in the ‘examples/logs’ folder in the SoNSTAR
repository [8].
Fig. 7 shows part of the IP flow log file indicating how
some botnet patterns use normal behaviours that are repeated
several times within a single time window. This represents
part of time window number 14 from the IP flow numbers 19
to 30. The IP flow log file can be found in the repository [8].
14&19&172.16.0.11&194.176.201.22&1&1&1&0&0&1&0&0&2&4&7&7&0&0&0\\
Anomaly. rebot activity A 111
14&20&172.16.0.11&64.250.228.130&1&1&1&0&0&1&0&0&2&4&7&7&0&0&0\\
Anomaly. rebot activity A 111
14&21&172.16.0.11&222.255.37.15&1&1&1&0&0&1&0&0&2&4&7&7&0&0&0\\
Anomaly. rebot activity A 111
14&22&172.16.0.11&216.200.145.235&1&1&1&0&0&1&0&0&2&4&7&7&0&0&0\\
Anomaly. rebot activity A 111
14&23&172.16.0.11&64.233.183.27&3&3&3&0&0&3&0&0&6&12&21&21&0&0&0\\
Anomaly. rebot activity A 111
14&24&172.16.0.11&207.115.21.22&1&1&1&0&0&1&0&0&2&4&7&7&0&0&0\\
Anomaly. rebot activity A 111
14&25&172.16.0.11&217.72.192.149&1&1&1&0&0&1&0&0&2&4&7&7&0&0&0\\
Anomaly. rebot activity A 111
14&26&172.16.0.11&13.8.138.217&1&1&1&0&0&1&0&0&2&4&7&7&0&0&0\\
Anomaly. rebot activity A 111
14&27&172.16.0.11&60.229.18.61&1&1&1&0&0&1&0&0&2&4&7&7&0&0&0\\
Anomaly. rebot activity A 111
14&28&172.16.0.11&12.168.122.203&1&1&1&0&0&1&0&0&2&4&7&7&0&0&0\\
Anomaly. rebot activity A 111
14&29&172.16.0.11&64.5.42.8&1&1&1&0&0&1&0&0&2&4&7&7&0&0&0\\
Anomaly. rebot activity A 111
14&30&172.16.0.11&144.140.80.13&1&1&1&0&0&1&0&0&2&4&7&7&0&0&0\\
Anomaly. rebot activity A 111
FIGURE 7. Part of the IP Flow log file (‘rebot’ = repeated botnet).
2) Feature construction: Example 1
Event 2 in Table 1 has the following event condition based on
the three way handshake mechanism, and the function of the
RST packet in the TCP protocol: ‘SYN in IPs >10 and SYN
in IPs <30 and PSH ACK out IPs == 0 and RST out IPs >0’.
This means that if a host received 10–30 SYN packets
requesting a connection but returned no data (zero PSH-
ACK packets and one or more RST packets) then the rain-
on-roof sound should be played. This sound will tell the
VOLUME X, 2018 9
Debashi and Vickers: Sonification of Botnet Behaviour
operator that the network is receiving requests for connection
on multiple ports but no data was returned. This is analogous
to customers repeatedly coming into a shop, asking the price
of an item, and then leaving without making a purchase. As
any closed port will sent an RST packet on receipt of any
incoming packet type, this behaviour is indicative of a port
scan.
3) Feature construction: Example 2
For another example, consider time window 8 where the
IP address 172.16.0.11 was recognized. The IP flow
log file is searched for time window 8 and the IP address
172.16.0.11. An extract of this time window log is
shown in Table 9.
Using this information a pattern can be built. The first IP
flow seen is flow 412 between hosts 172.16.0.11 and
195.188.53.99. The numbers of FIN out and FIN in,
SYN out, and SYN-ACK in packets are greater than 0 and
are all equal. Therefore, the first part of the pattern is the
condition: ‘FIN out IPs == FIN in IPs == SYN out IPs ==
SYN ACK in IPs > 0’.
We know from the TCP protocol that following a FIN in
and SYN out pair, an ACK out packet is a confirmation of the
communication. We see that in IP flow 412, ACK out = FIN
in + SYN out, so another condition is added to the pattern:
‘ACK out IPs == FC9 where FC9 = FIN in IPs + SYN out
IPs’ (see Table 6).
We also see that the number of ACK-in packets is greater
than ACK-out by 2, so the pattern is extended by the condi-
tion ‘FC10 >=2 where FC10 = ACK in IPs − ACK out IPs’.
Next we observe that PSH-ACK-out and PSH-ACK-in
packet counts are equal (7), so the condition ‘PSH ACk out
IPs == PSH ACk in IPs >= 1’ is added.
The condition ‘ACK in IPs < PSH ACk in IPs’ is added to
reflect the relationship between the number of ACK-in and
PSH-ACK packets.
Therefore, the complete pattern is ‘FINoutIPs == FINinIPs
== SYNoutIPs == SYNACKinIPs >0 and ACKoutIPs ==
FC9 and FC10 >1 and PSH ACK out IPs == PSH ACK in
IPs >0 and ACK in IPs <PSH ACK in IPs’, which is event
condition 30 in Table 10. If this pattern is repeated twice
in a time window then this is indicative of botnet activity.
Because normal traffic takes the form of a random pattern
it cannot be repeated as quickly as happens in the case of
botnets especially if it repeats in a single time period several
times.
C. EXPERIMENT 2: USING SoNSTAR AS A PASSIVE IDS
TO VALIDATE DISCOVERED PATTERNS
Above, by acting in the role of network operator, we used
SoNSTAR to identify the behaviour of botnets inside the
ISOT dataset traffic. As a result, through sound and log files,
we were able to discover six IP flow patterns which indicate
bot behaviour. Therefore, we considered using SoNSTAR
as a passive IDS based on the patterns discovered. Con-
sequently, an algorithm was added to detect botnets in the
dataset based on the IP flow patterns shown in Table 10.
The results need to be evaluated based on a labelled
dataset and compared against other methods using the same
dataset. Therefore, the detection algorithm was configured
for different durations of time window to identify and label
each detected flow as normal or malicious before storing the
results in a log file. Table 11 shows how the resulting log file
is structured.
The log file columns are, from left to right, the time win-
dow, the flow number in the time window, the flow number
in the dataset, host A, host B, SoNSTAR classification result,
and the label derived from the labelled dataset.
1) Evaluation metrics
To evaluate SoNSTAR as an anomaly detector based on the
IP flow patterns just constructed, performance was assessed
using the following metrics:
(i) The number of true positives (TP) where SoNSTAR
correctly identifies a malicious flow.
(ii) The number of true negatives (TN) where SoNSTAR
correctly identifies a normal (non-malicious) flow.
(iii) The number of false positives (FP) where SoNSTAR
mistakenly identifies a normal flow as malicious (bot-
net) activity.
(iv) The number of false negatives (FN) where SoNSTAR
mistakenly identifies a malicious flow as a normal flow.
These metrics were, in turn, used to calculate the precision,
recall (true positive rate), false positive rate, accuracy, and





















The SoNSTAR detection algorithm was run three times to
read the whole ISOT dataset with three different time win-
dows (20, 30, and 60 s) to evaluate the reliability of the
discovered IP flow patterns. Tables 12 and 13 show the results
achieved.
3) Comparison
The experiment used the same ISOT evaluation dataset and
metrics as Kirubavathi and Anitha [38]. They evaluated three
different machine learning classifiers: the Boosted decision
tree ensemble classifier (AdaBoostM1+J48), Naive Bayesian
(NB) statistical classifier and the Support Vector Machine
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TABLE 9. Sample of vertical activity to local destination IP log file.
Time
window Flow Host A Host B
Packet counts
FIN SYN SYN-ACK RST ACK PSH-ACK URG-
PSH-FIN NULL LANDOut In Out In Out In Out In Out In Out In
8 412 172.16.0.11 195.188.53.99 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 4 7 7 0 0 0
8 413 172.16.0.11 82.185.226.116 2 2 2 0 0 2 0 0 4 8 14 14 0 0 0
8 414 172.16.0.11 66.193.69.2 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 4 7 7 0 0 0
8 415 172.16.0.11 63.166.215.100 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 4 7 7 0 0 0
8 416 172.16.0.11 217.116.0.152 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 4 7 7 0 0 0
8 417 172.16.0.11 80.240.225.37 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 4 7 7 0 0 0
8 418 172.16.0.11 195.242.120.10 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 4 7 7 0 0 0
8 419 172.16.0.11 209.59.136.109 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 4 7 7 0 0 0
8 420 172.16.0.11 80.12.242.15 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 4 7 7 0 0 0
8 421 172.16.0.11 66.218.66.215 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 4 7 7 0 0 0
8 422 172.16.0.11 205.152.58.32 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 4 7 7 0 0 0
8 423 172.16.0.11 143.100.37.72 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 4 7 7 0 0 0
8 424 172.16.0.11 213.161.248.130 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 4 7 7 0 0 0
8 425 172.16.0.11 212.88.148.234 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 4 7 7 0 0 0
8 426 172.16.0.11 64.251.84.10 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 4 7 7 0 0 0
8 427 172.16.0.11 80.207.150.20 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 4 7 7 0 0 0
8 428 172.16.0.11 66.216.121.101 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 4 7 7 0 0 0
TABLE 10. Feature-to-sound mappings of botnet patterns. The squirrel sound is used when multiple sources repeatedly target a single host. The rat sound
denotes a single host receiving the same number of packets across multiple ports.
No Event Conditions Sound
30 FIN out IPs == FIN in IPs == SYN out IPs == SYN ACK in IPs >0 and ACK out IPs == FC 9 and FC 10 >1 and PSH ACK
out IPs == PSH ACK in IPs >0 and ACK in IPs <PSH ACK in IPs (if repeated twice in the same time window (if R2T))
Squirrel
running quickly
31 FIN out IPs == 0 and FIN in IPs == SYN out IPs == SYN ACK in IPs >0 and ((ACK out IPs == FC 9 and RST out IPs ==0
)or (ACK out IPs == FC 9 +1 and RST out IPs == 0 )or (ACK out IPs == FC 13 and RST out IPs ==1)) and ACK in IPs
<ACK out IPs and PSH ACK out IPs >PSH ACk in IPs >0 and RST in IPs == 0 (if R2T)
Rat moving in
dried leaves
32 FIN out IPs == FIN in IPs == SYN out IPs == SYN ACK in IPs == ACK in IPs >0 and RST in IPs == FC 9 and ACK out
IPs == PSH ACk out IPs == PSH ACk in IPs >0 and ACK in IPs <ACK out IPs and SYN in IPs == SYN ACK out IPs ==
RST out IPs == 0 (if R2T)
Squirrel
running quickly
33 FIN out IPs == FIN in IPs >0 and SYN out IPs == SYN ACK in IPs == ACK in IPs >0 and RST in IPs == FC 11 and
((ACK out IPs == PSH ACk in IPs >0 and (PSH ACk out IPs == FC 12 or PSH ACk out IPs == PSH ACk in IPs ) ) or (PSH
ACk in IPs == PSH ACk out IPs >0 and ACK out IPs == FC 12 or ACK out IPs == PSH ACk in IPs)) and ACK in IPs
<ACK out IPs and SYN in IPs == SYN ACK out IPs == RST out IPs == 0 (if R2T)
Squirrel
running quickly
34 FIN out IPs == 0 and FIN in IPs == 0 and SYN out IPs == 1 and SYN in IPs == 0 and SYN ACK out IPs == 0 and SYN
ACK in IPs == 1 and RST in IPs == RST out IPs == 0 and ACK out IPs == 1 and ACK in IPs == 0 and PSH ACk out IPs ==
0 and PSH ACK in IPs == 0 (if R2T)
Rat moving in
dried leaves
35 FIN out IPs == FIN in IPs >0 and SYN out IPs == SYN in IPs == SYN ACK out IPs == SYN ACK in IPs == RST out IPs
== 0 and RST in IPs == FC 11 and ACK out IPs == PSH ACK out IPs == PSH ACk in IPs >FC 11 and ACK in IPs <ACK
out IPs (if R2T)
Squirrel
running quickly
TABLE 11. SoNSTAR classification log file excerpt. The SoNSTAR classifications can be compared against the labels in the ISOT dataset.
Time window Time window flow id Dataset flow i.d. Host A Host B
Classification
SoNSTAR ISOT
75 42 11174 172.16.0.12 65.54.244.40 Malicious Malicious
75 43 11175 172.16.0.12 65.55.88.22 Malicious Malicious
75 44 11176 172.16.0.12 216.39.53.3 Malicious Malicious
75 45 11177 172.16.0.12 128.192.1.108 Malicious Malicious
75 46 11178 172.16.0.12 65.54.245.72 Malicious Malicious
75 47 11179 172.16.0.12 65.54.245.8 Malicious Malicious
75 48 11180 172.16.2.13 203.69.42.35 Normal Normal
75 49 11181 172.16.2.2 69.147.121.161 Normal Normal
75 50 11182 172.16.2.12 203.84.202.164 Normal Normal
75 51 11183 172.16.2.13 87.248.113.14 Normal Normal
75 52 11184 172.16.2.2 209.85.135.103 Normal Normal
75 53 11185 172.16.2.2 209.85.135.147 Normal Normal
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TABLE 12. FP, FN, TP and TN results.
Time window FP FN TP TN
20 s 152 144 12,543 510,720
40 s 136 75 11,105 463,000
60 s 312 49 10,632 443,819
TABLE 13. Comparison measures with time window of 20 s, 40 s and 60 s.
Window Precision Recall F-measure Accuracy FPR
20 s 0.988 0.989 0.988 0.999 0.000297
40 s 0.987 0.993 0.991 0.9995 0.000293
60 s 0.971 0.9954 0.983 0.999 0.0007
(SVM) discriminative classifier. Their results are based on
three time windows of 60 s, 120 s, and 180 s. Table 14
compares the results achieved by SoNSTAR with the three
systems measured by Kirubavathi and Anitha with a 60 s
time window. The comparison shows that the six patterns
discovered by listening to SoNSTAR achieved a better de-
tection accuracy, recall, precision and very low false positive
rate. Note, that SoNSTAR achieves even better results with
smaller time windows, with the best results being achieved
with a 20 s window (Table 13). We conclude that involving
human understanding in the detection of botnets increases the
chances of detecting them, especially so in the case of new
botnets.
TABLE 14. Comparison with existing methods at time window of 60 s.
Classifier Precision Recall F-measure Accuracy FPR
AdaBoostM1+J48 0.958 0.933 0.954 0.9413 0.12
NB 0.979 0.976 0.968 0.9586 0.04
SVM 0.936 0.943 0.939 0.9137 0.14
SoNSTAR 0.971 0.995 0.983 0.9992 0.0007
4) Discussion
SoNSTAR enables the user to explore distributed, parallel
and horizontal behaviours that are similar to normal be-
haviours but which can be linked to DDoS or botnet char-
acteristics. Although every single flow may be normal, the
overall behaviour is suspicious. Moreover, the user recog-
nizes identical IP flow patterns repeated several times within
the same time window and probably also within several
subsequent time windows. It is not expected to see such
behaviour within normal traffic and what might be treated as
normal behaviour by a machine, looks suspicious to a human
operator. Therefore, normal behaviour from several different
external hosts cannot use a specific communication mecha-
nism unless it was programmed to perform such action.
Acting as the network operator, we have discovered some
repeated identical behaviours within traffic flows. In our
study of these flow patterns, we found that it would be
impossible for this normal behaviour to be repeated several
times in a single time period, which indicates that it is
botnet behaviour. To facilitate the detection of the discovered
patterns in the future, we have mapped them into recorded
sounds.
The advantage of using sonification is that the user is in-
formed immediately about any traffic activity and the sounds
are easier to follow and comprehend. Visualization is capable
of representing traffic behaviour, but it is difficult for the
user to follow and recognize the frequency and sequence of
occurrence of events in the way that sonification can provide,
not least because it would require constant attention to a
visual display. Therefore, sonification and visualization have
to be integrated to raise security situational awareness.
Any features, events or patterns discovered to be symp-
toms of malicious behaviour could then be passed to any IDS
and tested and used in a machine learning process afterwards.
SoNSTAR improves situational awareness levels and allows
users to learn more about their own network environment
rather than studying network behaviour in general. As soon
as the SoNSTAR user starts monitoring the network, they
will recognize various thresholds and normal behaviours that
pertain to their network environment and after some time
will easily be able to distinguish different normal behaviours.
Any unusual ‘normal’ behaviour will become a suspicious
behaviour which will improve the user’s awareness level.
The operator can use SoNSTAR to study the vulnerability
of a network. For example, the operator could perform a
penetration test against the network while monitoring it with
SoNSTAR. The user can perform expected attacks based
on the network’s purpose and any adversary’s motivations.
SoNSTAR will be able to help the user to create events which
reveal those attacks even if they take the form of normal
behaviour.
IV. CONCLUSION
IDS technologies do not include the protocol flow granularity
required to understand network events inside an environment.
Our proposed solution is to use SoNSTAR to learn about
those environments and then IDS technology could be de-
veloped specifically for specific environments and can be
deployed with confidence in detecting malicious activity.
This paper described a novel and innovative method to
tackle botnet issues. This represents the first mechanism for
sonifying botnet behaviour. Its objective is to target botnet
events in order to enable the operator to recognize them.
To successfully achieve this target, we have introduced new
extracted features that create events which can target botnet
behaviour. SoNSTAR does not use any botnet detection algo-
rithm, but enables a human operator to recognize botnets by
linking sounds of events to the structure of botnet behaviour
and then to extract botnet IP flow patterns, and then to con-
firm the presence of botnet activity by finding those patterns
repeated within a time window.
We defined six patterns of botnet behaviour representing
normal flow patterns used by botnets. From the ISOT dataset
we found evidence of botnets having a unique repetitive
IP flow patterns. This shows that our sonification approach
12 VOLUME X, 2018
Debashi and Vickers: Sonification of Botnet Behaviour
and IP flow structures can be used to detect known botnets
as well as novel ones. And we have demonstrated that our
sonification mechanism is effective in revealing important
aspects of botnet patterns. The pattern validation experiment
shows how patterns discovered by SoNSTAR could be used
by IDSs to mitigate the effects of a zero-day attack.
In its current form, the system provides the network ad-
ministrator with a way of hearing various traffic behaviours
thereby allowing them to draw inferences about what is
happening in much the way that we monitor our own ev-
eryday surroundings. Because SoNSTAR maps data to pre-
recorded sounds there is scope for further parameterized con-
trol whereby additional data features could modulate those
sounds in meaningful ways (a technique called Parameter
Mapping Sonification).
Further research and development can be conducted to
represent log file information in a visual manner, which
would enable more real-time integration between sonification
and visualization. Furthermore, four new algorithms were
added to the proof-of-concept SoNSTAR systems and no
detrimental impact on the system performance was observed.
However, it would be instructive to run performance tests to
determine the scaleability of adding successive algorithms
for dealing with new traffic features. SoNSTAR can be in-
stalled on a network gateway or, if the network is very large
with lots of traffic, then multiple instances could be installed
on subnet gateways. Further work is needed to determine the
thresholds for making such decisions.
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